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NOTES
perpetrates a wrong against society. It does not include the right to harm
his person with impunity. "A man does not cease to be a human being
because he is convicted and is imprisoned. . . . Although occupying a
felon's cell, he may experience as great mental anguish over the dis-
figurement of his person as if he were a free man, and the law is not so
inhuman as to deny him compensation in damages against anyone who
may have negligently inflicted an injury upon him.""7
To say the least, the prison inmate is in an unusual position. In
many respects he is helpless to help himself. If he is forced to await
completion of his sentence before initiating suit, he finds that his proof
has become stale. Such a procedure also has little or no deterrent effect.
The very fact that he is a penal inmate and that most, if not all, of his
witnesses are fellow inmates is a decided disadvantage.88 If the suit
must be brought against the employee who has actually harmed the
prisoner, and not against that authority which incarcerated him, the fi-
nancial responsibility of the defendant will often make such a suit highly
impractical.
The penal inmate who is injured faces two tremendous obstacles-
sovereign immunity and civil death. It would be inequitable to propose
that a felon should be granted civil recourse to the courts, when his fel-
low citizens outside the prison walls are not. He has committed a wrong
against society. Yet in that small area where the prisoner, helpless as
he is to prevent such treatment, is willfully and maliciously subjected to
inhuman treatment, it is most unjust to allow him to go uncompensated
and to leave his antagonist free to continue the assault.
PRICE-FIXING WITHIN THE BARBER INDUSTRY
The barber trade faces problems in the realm of self-government
and self-regulation which can best be solved by a system of fixed indus-
try prices. The problems which barber groups can advantageously elimi-
nate through a fixed price system are temporary but costly price wars;
competition from low cost, price-cutting shops; and prices which in-
adequately or unsatisfactorily cover the personal income needs of local
barbers. Often, however, price-fixing methods employed by barber
groups conflict with social and economic policies embodied in state anti-
87. St. Louis I.M. & S. Ry. v. Hydrick, 109 Ark. 231, 234, 160 S.W. 196, 199 (1913).
88. The credibility of such individuals is always subject to serious examination, and
in many cases they may actually be afraid to talk.
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trust laws and in judicial interpretations of state constitutions. The first
two methods-agreements among competing master barbers and union
price-fixing activities-have been attacked as violative of state antitrust
laws. The third method, legislative authorization for a fixed price sys-
tem, has frequently been attacked as an unlawful delegation of legislative
power and as lacking state due process of law. The purpose of this in-
quiry is to examine the legality of these three methods and to compare
the consistency of state courts in applying similar, underlying principles
when the legality of each method is questioned.
Master Barber Agreements. The traditional method by which trade
prices are controlled is the employers' agreement. Attempts to fix prices
in this manner, however, are illegal per se under the federal' and most
state2 antitrust statutes. The Supreme Court set forth the reasons' for
1. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951); United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) ; United States v. Trenton Potteries
Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1926). Trade association schemes to govern prices, other than open
pricing agreements, have been declared unlawful in Sugar Institute v. United States,
297 U.S. 553 (1936) ; United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923) ;
and American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921). For dis-
cussions of trade association problems see Donovan, Trade Association Administration
and Protection under the Antitrust and Other Laws (pts. 1-2), 30 GEo. L.J. 17, 149
(1941) ; Stocking, The Rule of Reason, Workable Competition, and the Legality of
Trade Association Activities, 21 U. Ci. L. REv. 527 (1954).
2. Endicott v. Rosenthal, 216 Cal. 721, 16 P.2d 673 (1932); Commonwealth v.
McHugh, 326 Mass. 249, 93 N.E.2d 751 (1950) ; State v. Croft, 168 N.C. 208, 83 S.E.
772 (1914) ; State ex rel. Cullitan v. Greater Cleveland Livery Owners Ass'n, 74 N.E.2d
104 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pleas 1947); 4 Ops. Att'y Gen. Tex. 162 (1942); 28 Ops. Att'y
Gen. Wis. 165 (1939); Note, 25 U. CINc. L. Rxv. 476 (1956); Comment, 1951 Wis.
L. Rxv. 657, 672.
New York and Indiana law is unsettled. Unreasonableness was said to be the test
in New York Clothing Mfrs. Exch. v. Textile Finishers' Ass'n, 238 App. Div. 444,
265 N.Y. Supp. 105 (1st Dep't 1933) (dicta). But see Pleaters, Stitchers & Embroiderers'
Ass'n v. Jaffe Pleating Co., 176 Misc. 411, 27 N.Y.S.2d 615 (N.Y.C. Munic. Ct. 1941),
where the court refused to enforce a "Basic Minimum Cost Schedule," apparently
without regard to the reasonableness of the prices fixed; and Photo-Engravers Bd. of
Trade, Inc. v. Addison, 145 Misc. 479, 260 N.Y. Supp. 333 (App.T. 1932), aff'd, 239
App. Div. 827, 264 N.Y. Supp. 939 (1st Dep't 1933), where the court refused to enforce
an agreement in which a photo-engravers' association fixed trade prices without regard
to their reasonableness.
The Indiana court indicated in Over v. Byram Foundry Co., 37 Ind. App. 452,
77 N.E. 302 (1906), that it might inquire into the reasonableness. In that case the
issue of reasonableness was raised with regard to prices fixed in an output contract.
The court stated that such an output contract was not a restraint upon trade when the
unreasonableness of prices was not alleged and proved. More recent authority that
Indiana would probably hold price-fixing illegal per se is provided by Fort Wayne
Cleaners and Dyers' Ass'n v. Price, 127 Ind. App. 13, 137 N.E.2d 738 (1956).
Price-fixing was declared unlawful only when prices were unreasonable in Moody
& Waters v. Case-Moody Corp., 354 Ill. 82, 187 N.E. 813 (1933), and unlawful only
when the prices were unreasonable and actively tend toward monopoly in Group Health
Co-op. v. King County Medical Soc'y, 39 Wash. 2d 586, 237 P.2d 737 (1952).
For general comments on the problem see Note, 32 CoLuM. L. REv. 347 (1932);
Annot., 50 A.L.R. 1000 (1927).
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this rule in the following language:
• . it does not follow that agreements to fix or main-
tain prices are reasonable restraints and therefore permitted by
the statute, merely because the prices themselves are reason-
able ....
The aim and result of every price-fixing agreement, if
effective, is the elimination of one form of competition. The
power to fix prices, whether reasonably exercised or not, in-
volves power to control the market and to fix arbitrary and
unreasonable prices. The reasonable price fixed today may
through economic and business changes become the unreason-
able price of tomorrow. Once established it may be maintained
unchanged because of the absence of competition secured by
the agreement for a price reasonable when fixed. Agreements
which create such potential power may well be held to be in
themselves unreasonable or unlawful restraints, without the
necessity of minute inquiry whether a particular price is rea-
sonable or unreasonable as fixed and without placing on the
government in enforcing the Sherman Law the burden of ascer-
taining from day to day whether it has become unreasonable
through the mere variation of economic conditions.4
Whether this rule will be applied to prohibit prices fixed by a mas-
ter barbers' agreement' depends on the interpretation of state antitrust
statutes and common law restraints of trade. Only where state law is
interpreted to embrace services will such price-fixing run the risk of
legal proscription. When the antitrust statute is worded in terms of
3. "Whatever may have been the status of price-fixing agreements at common
law . . . the Sherman Act has a broder application to them than the common law
prohibitions or sanctions. . . . Price-fixing agreements may or may not be aimed at
complete elimination of price competition. The groups making those agreements may
or may not have power to control the market. But the fact that the group cannot control
the market prices does not necessarily mean that the agreement as to price has no
utility to the members of the combination. The effectiveness of price-fixing agreements
is dependent on many factors, such as competitive tactics, position in the industry, the
formula underlying price policies. Whatever economic justification particular price-
fixing agreements may be thought to have, the law does not permit an inquiry into their
reasonableness. They are all banned because of their actual or potential threat to the
central nervous system of the economy." United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
310 U.S. 150, 225-26, n. 59 (1940). See generally Arr'Y. GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST
REP. 12 (1955).
4. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 396-98 (1926).
5. As used in this note, master barbers are those who own and operate their own
shops. They may be employers or self-employed. Journeymen barbers are employees
of master barbers.
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"commodities," state courts generally exclude services from its coverage.
When so interpreted the statute may not be used as a basis for a criminal
indictment, for an award of civil damages or an injunction, or for avoid-
ing liability for a breach of a price-fixing contract relating to services.
In one of the earliest cases in which this issue arose under a state anti-
trust statute, the Texas Supreme Court held that statutory language pro-
hibiting combinations "to limit or reduce the production or increase or
reduce the price of merchandise or commodities . . . . " did not apply
to a combination fixing uniform insurance rates and uniform commis-
sion rates for insurance salesmen.' Refusing to dissolve the association,'
the court said that the word commodity "is ordinarily used in the com-
mercial sense of any moveable or tangible thing that is ordinarily pro-
duced or used as the subject of barter or sale . . . ."
In a habeas corpus action to determine the sufficiency of an indict-
ment returned against a group of local physicians for fixing fees, the
Iowa Supreme Court held that professional services were not covered
by the state antitrust statute' which prohibited fixing the price "of any
article of merchandise or commodity."" Similarly, in a criminal action
to recover a penalty from a combination of Little Rock launderers, the
Arkansas Supreme Court held that the state antitrust statute forbidding
the fixing of the price of any "article of manufacture, mechanism, com-
modity, convenience, repair, any product of mining, or any article or
thing whatsoever . . . . " did not extend to the furnishing of laundry
service. 8 The Iowa and Arkansas courts pointed out that the rule of
strict construction of criminal statutes precluded an interpretation of
''commodity" to include services.
Moreover, under a statute 4 identical to the Arkansas law, the Mis-
souri Supreme Court held that laundry service was not covered by the
word "convenience."
Laundries do not sell articles which come within the terms
of the statute. True, the operation of a laundry is a business.
However it sells a service and nothing more. It may be a con-
venient way for thousands of people to have their linen laun-
6. Tex. Laws 1889, at 141.
7. Queen Ins. Co. v. State, 86 Tex. 250, 24 S.W. 397 (1893).
8. The court treated corporate dissolution as a criminal penalty.
9. Queen Ins. Co. v. State, 86 Tex. 250, 256, 24 S.W. 397, 401 (1893).
10. Rohlf v. Kasemeier, 140 Iowa 182, 118 N.W. 276 (1908).
11. IOWA CoDE § 553.1 (1954).
12. Ark. Acts 1905, at 1.
13. State v. Frank, 114 Ark. 47, 169 S.W. 333 (1914).
14. Mo. REv. STAT. § 8701 (1929).
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dered, hence a convenience, but it is not an article of conveni-
ence bought and sold as the statute implies.15
To reach this result the court said that the statute applied only when
some article was bought or sold. The court read each word of the series
as if preceded by the phrase "article of"16 and concluded that laundry
service did not constitute an "article of convenience"" since no article
was bought or sold in the ordinary course of the laundry business. Only
by straining the meaning of statutory language in this manner could the
court interpret the word "convenience" to exclude services.
Even in civil actions where one party seeks to enforce a contract and
another sets up the defense that the contract is in restraint of trade and,
therefore, unenforceable, state courts have held that antitrust statutes
using the terminology of "commodity" are not applicable to service in-
dustries."8 Thus price-fixing contracts within service trades are legally
enforceable.
15. State v. Green, 344 Mo. 985, 988-89, 130 S.W.2d 475, 477 (1939).
16. The error of this interpretation appears when "article of" is placed before
"mechanism" or "commodity."
17. State v. Green, 344 Mo. 985, 989, 130 S.W.2d 475, 477 (1939).
18. For example, in Master Barbers Ass'n v. Baiata, 304 Ill. App. 252, 26 N.E.2d
187 (1940), the court affirmed a contempt citation after failure of the defendant barber
to comply with an injunction forbidding reduction of his prices below association fixed
levels. In an abstract opinion, the court indicated that such a price-fixing contract in the
service trade would be enforceable and would not fall within the scope of the seldom
enforced state antitrust law. The court did not mention the unenforceability of common
law restraints of trade. In Downing v. Lewis, 56 Neb. 386, 76 N.W. 900 (1898), the
court held that the antitrust statute applied only to manufacturing plants and that
laundries were not within the coverage of the act since they were not such establishments.
Thus the price-fixing contract was held enforceable.
In Carlton v. Manuel, 64 Nev. 570, 187 P.2d 558 (1947), a cross-complaint was
filed in which the defendant sought to avoid payment of an alleged contract obligation
because the price had been fixed by a combination of launderers and was in restraint
of trade. Since Nevada has no antitrust statute, the court held on common law principles
that only those non-ancillary restraints which pertain to articles or commodities are
unenforceable; since laundry service amounted to labor, the contract remained enforce-
able. Without citing common law precedent, the court reached this result on the
basis of State v. Frank, 114 Ark. 47, 169 S.W. 333 (1914) ; Rohlf v. Kasemeier, 140
Iowa 182, 118 N.W. 276 (1908); State v. McClellan, 155 La. 37, 98 So. 748 (1924);
and Queen Ins. Co. v. State, 86 Tex. 250, 24 S.W. 397 (1893), all of which involved
state antitrust statutes. On the other hand, in More v. Bennett, 140 Ill. 69, 29 N.E. 588
(1892), the Illinois Supreme Court refused to enforce a contract fixing the price of
legal stenographic work in the Chicago area. Thus this non-ancillary restraint of
trade, typically unenforceable at common law, was unenforceable also when personal
services were involved.
In regard to the appropriate relief, the only state which has decided the issue held
in Group Health Co-op. v. King County Medical Soc'y, 39 Wash. 2d 586, 237 P.2d 737
(1952), that an injunction should be issued against a price-fixing combination in the
medical profession. This result was reached on the basis of a statute prohibiting the
fixing of the price of any "product."
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In criminal actions, state statutory language forbidding "restraints
of trade" has usually been interpreted to exclude services, although there
is an opposite tendency in a number of recent decisions."9 In civil suits,
on the other hand, it is generally accepted that language prohibiting "re-
straints of trade" embraces service industries. For instance, one state
supreme court refused to hold the fixing of commission rates for insur-
ance salesmen illegal and criminally punishable by corporate dissolution"
under the portion of the state antitrust statute which prohibited the for-
mation of combinations "to create or carry out restrictions in trade."'"
Since all restraints of trade were not crimes at common law, the court
declared that it would have to look beyond the technical and legal mean-
ing of the phrase to the meaning of the word "trade." The court con-
cluded that "trade" implied traffic, and was not used by the legislature
in the sense of an occupation. Similarly in a criminal action in State v.
McClellan, 2 the Louisiana Supreme Court excluded laundry service from
the coverage of an antitrust statute which specified in part "that every
person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize . . . any part
of the trade or commerce within the state of Louisiana, shall be deemed
guilty .... ,,23 Affirming a motion to quash to the indictment, the
court held that the word "trade" was too indefinite to define an element
of an alleged crime. Consequently the court looked to the section of the
statute concerned with exclusive dealing to define "trade" and concluded
that since laundry service did not involve the dealing in goods, wares,
and merchandise, it did not fall within the scope of the general prohibi-
tion on monopolies in trade and commerce.
In a civil action to enjoin a violation of a price-fixing contract,2"
however, the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of an in-
junction on the ground that the constitutional provision prohibiting "all
combinations, trust, or conspiracies in restraint of trade, commerce or
business .... "25 afforded a complete defense. Even though the court
did not comment on the applicability of this provision to service indus-
19. See cases cited notes 32, 33 infra.
20. Queen Ins. Co. v. State, 86 Tex. 250, 24 S.W. 397 (1893).
21. Tex. Laws 1889, at 141.
22. 155 La. 37, 98 So. 748 (1924).
23. La. Acts 1915, No. 11.
24. Cleaners, Dyers and Pressers Local 228 v. G.H.W. 'Cleaners & Dyers, Inc.,
200 La. 83, 7 So. 2d 623 (1942). Although California has held that services are covered
by a statute, CAL. Civ. CODE § 1673, making contracts in restraint of trade or business
void, Endicott v. Rosenthal, 216 Cal. 721, 16 P.2d 673 (1932) (action to recover money
on contract held unenforceable), the California courts have not yet decided whether
services are covered by a statute defining and punishing restraints of trade and com-
merce. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16720.
25. LA. CoNsT., art. 19.
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tries, a number of factors distinguish and reconcile this decision with the
court's conclusion in the McClellan case. First, the case involved civil,
not criminal action. Second, since contracts in restraint of trade were
traditionally unenforceable at common law, although not criminal, the use
of the phrase "restraint of trade" has an adequate meaning in this con-
text.2 Finally, the inclusion of the word "business" extends the applica-
bility of the constitutional provision further than the narrow language
used in the penal statute applied in McClellan.
Although there was no definition of "restraint of trade" in the
common law of crimes, there was a definition of "restraint of trade"
in the common law of contracts.2" Since the conduct covered by restraint
of trade is identical in both criminal and civil cases, the court could have
looked to the scope of the concept in the common law of contracts to
determine what and who were criminally punishable by the statute. There
is clearly no justification for a conclusion that restraint of trade means
one thing in a civil context and another in a criminal context.2"
Not only are contracts unenforceable when made to restrain trade,
but such contracts may also be grounds for civil injunctions and suits to
recover damages.29 In an action brought under the Indiana antitrust law,
a cleaning establishment sought to enjoin the defendant cleaning associa-
tion from fixing prices within its competitive area and asked for re-
covery of damages resulting to the business from the prior restraint."
The Indiana Appellate Court rejected the defense that services were not
covered by the statute which provided that "every scheme, design, under-
standing, contract, combination . . .or conspiracy in restraint of trade
or commerce . . ., or to limit or reduce the production, or increase or
reduce the price of merchandise or any commodity . . . is hereby de-
26. Compare the difference in the enforceability of contracts where the statutes
are in terms of "restraint of trade" with those in terms of "commodities." Even though
prices were fixed, statutes phrased in terms of "commodities" were interpreted to
leave such contracts enforceable. See note 18 supra. However, as indicated in note 24
supra, when the statute refers to "restraint of trade," the price-fixing contract is
unenforceable even though it involves personal services.
27. Courts differ on whether services were covered by common law restraints of
trade. In Carlton v. Manuel, 64 Nev. 570, 187 P.2d 558 (1947), the court concluded
that services were not covered. However, federal courts have reached a contradictory
conclusion and have held that services are within the meaning of "restraint of trade."
See note 34 infra.
28. In United States v. Nash, 229 U.S. 373 (1913), the Supreme Court held that
"restraint of trade" was not too indefinite to define a crime and that the court would
look to the common law meaning of the phrase and apply it in a criminal context.
29. See note 48 infra.
30. Fort Wayne Cleaners & Dyers Ass'n v. Price, 127 Ind. App. 13, 137 N.E.2d
738 (1956).
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clared to be illegal . . . . "" The Indiana court said that there are many
trades in which commodities are not bought and sold. "To adopt ap-
pellants' interpretation of the statute would be to permit monopolies
among those engaged in business where property or tangible articles in-
volved are not sold."32  At least one additional state has interpreted its
antitrust law prohibiting "restraints of trade" to permit the state to en-
join price-fixing activities within service industries.33 If civil action by
the state is permissible, there seems little reason why state criminal action
should not also be warranted by the same statutory language.
State courts which include services under "restraint of trade"
language rely heavily on Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States,34 in
which the United States sought and was granted an injunction against
price-fixing by the District of Columbia cleaning industry. In this case,
as well as in the recent state court decisions, the Court rejected the argu-
ment made in the Texas insurance case3" that trade means only traffic in
the buying, selling, or exchanging of commodities and, instead, imputed
to the word "trade" the connotation of an occupation. Specifically the
31. IND. ANN. STAT. § 23-126 (Burns 1950).
32. Fort Wayne Cleaners & Dyers Ass'n v. Price, 127 Ind. App. 13, 20, 137 N.E.2d
738, 742 (1956). Note also that in Arnold v. Board of Barber Examiners, 45 N.M. 57,
109 P.2d 779 (1941), the court indicated in dicta that fixed prices within the barber
trade would fall within the meaning of "restraint of trade" as used in the New Mexico
antitrust statute. In Group Health Co-op. v. King County Medical Soc'y, 39 Wash.
2d 586, 237 P.2d 737 (1952), the court inquired into the meaning of common law re-
straints of trade to determine what the word "product!' meant in a constitutional pro-
vision forbidding the making of a contract or a combination "for the purpose of fixing
the price or limiting the production or regulating the transportation of any product
or commodity." WASH. CONST. art. 12, § 22. The court said that since restraint of
trade covered medical service at common law and since it was the purpose of the
constitutional provision to forbid common law restraints of trade, the word "product"
should be given its broad dictionary definition and should be interpreted to include
services.
33. State ex tel. Cullitan v. Greater Cleveland Livery Owners' Ass'n, 74 N.E.2d
104 (Ohio Ct. Comm. Pleas 1947) (auto livery rental service). But in Wisconsin v.
LeSage, 1950-51 Trade Cas. 63741 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1950), the court said that fixing the
prices for personal services of undertakers did not violate the state antitrust statute
declaring that "every contract or combination in the nature of a trust or conspiracy
in restraint of trade or commerce is hereby declared illegal. Every contract, con-
spiracy . . . intended to restrain or prevent competition in the supply or price of any
article or commodity . . . is hereby declared an illegal restraint of trade." WIs. STAT.
§ 133.01 (1955). The court held that such personal service was labor and not within
the purview of the act. See also Hunt v. Riverside Co-op. Club, 140 Mich. 538, 104
N.W. 40 (1905).
34. 286 U.S. 427 (1932). For other federal decisions holding that services are
included within the meaning of the Sherman Act see United States v. National Ass'n
of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485 (1950) ; Darnell v. Markvood, 220 F.2d 374 (D.C.
Cir. 1954); United States v. American Medical Ass'n, 110 F.2d 709 (D.C. Cir. 1940),
cert. denied, 308 U.S. 599 (1940).
35. Queen Ins. Co. v. State, 86 Tex. 250, 24 S.W. 397 (1893).
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Supreme Court equated trade with any occupation, employment, or busi-
ness carried on for the purpose of profit or a livelihood. 6
A number of economic arguments may explain the intention of a
legislature to exclude services in those states where antitrust statutes
are worded in terms of "articles" and "commodities." Similar economic
arguments may have been utilized unconsciously by state courts in exclud-
ing services from the coverage of the penal sections of antitrust statutes
worded in terms of "restraint of trade." The most persuasive of these
arguments are that the minimal prior training and capital investment re-
quirements make entry into a service trade, such as barbering, compara-
tively easy; that the large number of persons typically engaged in any
service trade makes restraint more difficult in a service than in a com-
modity industry; and that the lack of a workable method to coerce new
entrants to conform to the price agreement makes the restraint un-
enforceable. Therefore, since any attempt to eliminate price competition
within a service trade is destined to be ineffective, legislation to prevent
such attempts should be unnecessary.
Such a position fails to take a number of important factors into
account. For instance, new entrants may wish to join the price agree-
ment rather than undercut existing prices; or, entry of a few service
establishments may affect competition and market conditions to such a
small extent that the restraint imposed by the master barber agreement
remains substantially the same after their entry. Moreover, though a
price is fixed, it may not be so unreasonable that new entrants are im-
mediately drawn into the area. Consequently, effective competition may
not be immediately forthcoming. Finally, entry into some trades may
be contingent upon local licensing.3" If these licensing requirements can
be influenced or controlled by the group seeking to fix prices, ease of
36. In reaching this conclusion the Court relied on a quote taken out of context
from an opinion by Justice Story construing the Coasting and Fishery Act of 1793.
Justice Story said: "The argument for the claimant insists, that 'trade' is here used in its
most restrictive sense, and as equivalent to traffic in goods, or buying and selling in
commerce or exchange. But I am clearly of opinion, that such is not the true sense of the
word, as used in the 32d section. In the first place, the word 'trade' is often, and indeed
generally, used in a broader sense, as equivalent to occupation, employment, or business,
whether manual or mercantile. Wherever any occupation, employment, or business is
carried on for the purpose of profit, or gain, or a livelihood, not in the liberal arts
or in the learned professions, it is constantly called a trade. Thus, we constantly speak
of the art, mystery, or trade of a housewright, a shipwright, a tailor, a blacksmith, and
a shoe-maker, though some of these may be, and sometimes are, carried on without
buying or selling goods." The Schooner Nymph, 18 Fed. Cas. 506, 508 (No. 10388)
(C.C.D.Me. 1834).
37. Due to the stringent requirements of state and local barber sanitation codes,
denial of a license would not be hard to justify even though the true reason for such
denial was to coerce the barber to enter the price-fixing combination.
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entry and inability to coerce compliance are weak arguments for the ex-
clusion of services from the coverage of state antitrust laws.
In concluding that services are not covered by antitrust statutes,
state courts do not rely alone on definitions of the statutory language.
In an action by the state to obtain the forfeiture of a corporate charter,
the Minnesota Supreme Court pointed to the privilege of laborers to
combine to fix their wages.3" The court held that agreement by the mem-
bers of the Board of Trade to fix commission rates for each buy and sell
transaction amounted to the fixing of wages for personal services; for
this reason, services were held not to be included within the coverage of
the state antitrust law.
Labor, whether physical, intellectual or a combination of
the two, is not by any fair rule of construction an "article of
trade, manufacture, or use," or an "article, commodity, or
utility" which "enters into the manufacture of any article of
utility" within the meaning of those words as used in the stat-
ute. Agreements to regulate the price of personal services, when
standing alone, have never been held to be agreements in re-
straint of trade, and it is only when connected with other con-
tracts and conduct which are in themselves illegal that they
come within the purview of the federal antitrust law.3"
In the Iowa physicians' case,4" the court agreed with the rule that
"labor is not a commodity within the meaning of the act"4 1 and proceeded
to state that a combination of physicians fixing medical fees was no dif-
ferent than a union lawfully regulating the wages of unskilled employees.
"We do not think that the act in question covers combinations to fix the
labor price whether that labor be skilled or unskilled."4 2  State courts
have held also that laundry service is merely the furnishing of labor and
that fixed prices merely fix launderers' wages.43
The United States Supreme Court has applied Section Three of the
Sherman Act to services and has specifically rejected the contention that
service is labor outside the meaning of the antitrust laws. In an action
enjoining the Washington Real Estate Board from further commission
fixing, the Court said: "The fact that the business involves the sale of
38. State v. Duluth Board of Trade, 107 Minn. 506, 121 N.W. 395 (1909).
39. Id. at 547, 121 N.W. at 412.
40. Rohlf v. Kasemier, 140 Iowa 182, 118 N.W. 276 (1908).
41. Id. at 188, 118 N.W. at 278.
42. Id. at 189, 118 N.W. at 279.
43. State v. Frank, 114 Ark. 47, 169 S.W. 333 (1914); State v. McClellan, 155
La. 37, 98 So. 748 (1924); State v. Green, 344 Mo. 985, 130 S.W.2d 475 (1939);
Carlton v. Manuel, 64 Nev. 570, 187 P.2d 558 (1947).
630
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personal services rather than commodities does not take it out of the
category of 'trade' within the meaning of §3 of the Act."44
A number of persuasive factors militate against extending to service
industries the designation of "labor" and hence exclusion from antitrust
laws merely because the furnishing of a service is involved. The most
important factor is the character of the labor immunity. As pointed out
in the succeeding section, when a group of persons organize a union and
engage in legitimate labor union activity, their conduct is immune from
antitrust prosecution. Since legitimate labor objectives are protected by
the immunity, there is no need to extend blanket immunity to services.
Moreover, the characteristics of the barber trade are not necessarily those
of labor. The primary function of labor's immunity is to permit em-
ployees to combine for the purpose of attaining greater bargaining equality
with the employers or purchasers of their services.4" Barbering, like most
other services, is a business enterprise and the master barbers are entre-
preneurs rather than employees. A combination of these entrepreneurs
does not create bargaining equaltiy between the sellers of service and the
consumer. In fact, such a combination tends to confer monopoly power
upon the seller.
Better reasoning would reject the contention that service is always
labor and always entitled to exemption from the antitrust laws. A basic
purpose of antitrust legislation is "the prevention of restraints to free
competition in business and commercial transactions which tend to re-
strict production, raise prices or otherwise control the market to the detri-
ment of purchasers or consumers . . . . "" Both the antitrust laws
and the labor exemption therefrom seek to eliminate power, which might
otherwise be abused, by equalizing "the relative bargaining positions of
the component elements of our democratic-capitalist economy so as to
preserve the competitive conditions upon which its successful functioning
depends."47 Extending the labor immunity to barbers because barbering
is a service does not permit bargaining equality between employers and
employees but affords the barbering trade an opportunity to fix prices
and to present a united price front against which the consumer is de-
fenseless.
44. United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 490 (1950).
45. Norris-La Guardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1937), 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1952). Similar
policies account for the labor immunity provisions of state antitrust laws. For a dis-
cussion of state statutes see Morgan, Unions and State Antitrust Laws, 7 LAB. L.J.
395 (1956).
46. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 (1940).
47. Gottesman, Restraint of Trade-Employees or Enterprisers?, 15 U. CHI.
L. Rav. 638, 650 (1948).
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Since the consumers' only remedy to counteract the unequal bargain-
ing strength procured by the sellers' price-fixing agreement lies in the
enforcement48 of antitrust laws against service industries-certainly by
making such contracts unenforceable, by civil remedies to compensate
injured competitors, and if not by criminal sanctions at least by a state
injunctive remedy-a reconsideration of antitrust statutes by state legis-
latures may be required. An amendment to the statute, such as enacted
in New York, 9 may be necessary in some states, especially in those juris-
dictions where the statute is couched in terms of "commodities." Such
an amendment may also be necessary in states using "restraint of trade"
language where services have been excluded by judicial decision. In
view of the more liberal interpretations of antitrust statutes recently and
the precedents available in Supreme Court decisions, states which have
not yet decided the issue may find a statutory amendment unnecessary.
Union Activities. Where services are included within state antitrust
statutes and the barber trade relies on a union to control prices, labor
immunity more appropriately becomes an issue. The barber trade's price
structure can be influenced by a barber union in one of tvo ways. The
prices can be fixed by voting in a local union comprising both master and
journeymen barbers or as a result of negotiations between journeymen
barber unions and master barber groups.
Antitrust statutes which specifically exempt labor unions"0 are inter-
preted to give immunity to workingmen or employees 5 organized into a
union only when the union is engaged in "legitimate labor activity" 2 or
48. Illustrative of the civil remedies are: "Three-fold the damages which may
be sustained, together with the costs of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee,"
IND. ANN. STAT. § 23-117 (Burns 1950) ; two-fold damages, OHio REV. CODE § 1331.08
(Anderson 1953). Illustrative of the criminal remedies are: $50 to $5000 fine and 6-12
months in prison-each day's violation constituting a separate offense, CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 16755; $5000 plus one year imprisonment maximum for natural persons
and $20,000 for corporations, N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 341.
49. Services were not covered by the New York antitrust statute prior to 1933.
New York Clothing Mfrs. Exch., Inc. v. Textile Finishers' Ass'n, 238 App. Div. 444,
265 N.Y. Supp. 105 (1st Dep't 1933). In that year services were specifically incorporated
into the statute. N.Y. GEN Bus. LAW § 340; Pleaters, Stitchers & Embroiderers' Ass'n
v. Jaffe Pleating Co., 176 Misc. 411, 27 N.Y.S.2d 615 (N.Y.C. Munic. Ct. 1941). Courts
have generally been most reluctant to extend antitrust laws to cover professional services.
Thus when a state statute specifically covers professional services, its scope would
probably also embrace service trades such as barbering. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 50-1-1
(1953).
50. E.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 340 (4); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16703. For
a general discussion of this exemption see Morgan, Unions and State Antitrust Laws,
7 LAB. L.J. 395 (1956).
51. E.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 340 (4). For an interpretation of this statute
see People v. Gassman, 295 N.Y. 254, 66 N.E.2d 705 (1946).
52. Manhatten Storage & Warehouse Co. v. Movers & Warehousemen's Ass'n, 262
App. Div. 332, 28 N.Y.S.2d 594 (1st Dep't 1941), rev'd on other grounds, 289 N.Y.
NOTES
"ordinary labor union activity." 3  Unlike federal courts, state courts do
not condemn union price-fixing activity merely because it is under-
taken in combination with an employer group or exempt it merely because
the union acts alone. 4  The basic test governing the lawfulness of union
activities under state antitrust laws is whether the union is negotiating
82, 43 N.E.2d 820 (1942) ; McDonnell v. Meat & Provision Drivers Local 626, 1952-53
Trade Cas. 67226 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951) (price-fixing or other unlawful activities);
Weitzberg v. Dubinsky, 173 Misc. 350, 18 N.Y. Supp. 97 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (bona fide
labor unions exempt); Schweizer v. Waiters & Bartenders Union 500, 121 Cal. App.
2d 45, 262 P.2d 568 (1953).
53. "There is no foundation for any contention that the state [antitrust) statute
does not apply to labor organizations. . . . There is nothing in its wording or history
to suggest that it does not apply, as do other statutes, to any group of persons whose
conduct brings them within the statutory terms." Commonwealth v. McHugh, 326 Mass.
249, 263-4, 93 N.E.2d 751, 761 (1950). In Massachusetts, the only protection given
labor unions is the procedural one of the state anti-injunction statute. MAss. GEN. LAws
ch. 214, § 9A, inserted by Stat. 1935, ch. 407, § 4. The court concluded that only when
the "terms and conditions of employment" are in controversy will there be a "labor
dispute" which the anti-injunction statute protects. In all other cases the union is
subject to the state antitrust law because it is not engaged in "ordinary labor union
activity."
54. Antitrust suits against labor unions are much less frequent under the Sherman
Act than under state antitrust laws. Prior to the enactment of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat.
730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1952), and the Norris-La Guardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932),
29 U.S.C. § 101 (1952), union activities which "essentially obstruct [ed] the free
flow of commerce between the states, or restrict fed], in that regard, the liberty of a
trader to engage in business . . ." were held to violate the Sherman Act. Lowe v.
Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 293 (1908). The Clayton Act, however, has been interpreted to
give unions nearly complete immunity from antitrust prosecution, United States v.
Hutchinson, 312 U.S. 219 (1940), by the simple expedient of incorporating § 20 into the
substantive application of the Sherman Act to labor activities. Because of this incorpora-
tion and, to a lesser degree, because of the incorporation of the Norris-La Guardia Act,
see generally Nathanson & Wirtz, The Hutchinson Case: Another View, 36 ILL. L. REv.
41 (1941), labor unions appear to be immune when acting alone. Unions are liable
to federal antitrust prosecution only when they combine with non-labor, employer
groups to control prices or suppress competition. Thus in the process of enjoining a union
from a combination with an employer group to monopolize the installation of electrical
equipment and to increase the prices of such installations in New York City, the
Supreme Court said: "So far as the union might have achieved this result acting
alone, it would have been the natural consequence of labor union activities exempted
by the Clayton Act from the coverage of the Sherman Act. . . . But when the union
participated with a combination of business men who had complete power to eliminate
all competition among themselves and to prevent all competition from others, a situation
was created not included within the exemption of the Clayton and Norris-La Guardia
Acts." Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797, 809 (1945). For a criticism
of the present state of the law see generally Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws-A
Preliminary Analysis, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 252 (1955).
Unlike federal courts, the state courts have not incorporated state anti-injunction
statutes into substantive antitrust law. Mayer Bros. Poultry Farms v. Meltzer, 274
App. Div. 169, 80 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1st Dep't 1948). Consequently state courts rely solely
upon antitrust legislation to determine the lawfulness of union activities subject to state
jurisdiction. State courts tend to hold labor unions to more rigid standards of behavior
than federal courts and are more willing to apply antitrust principles to union activity
if and when such activity results in controlled prices or restrained competition.
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and fixing the terms and conditions of employment for its members." If
the union's objective is within this classification, immunity from state
antitrust laws is generally attained.
The issue of legitimate labor union activity does not arise in an
organization composed entirely or primarily of master barbers." Master
barbers, as well as journeymen barbers, are not employees of the con-
sumer."r In fact, master barbers frequently have a working force under
their control and bear a greater resemblance to a business firm than to
laborers. In addition to the lack of an employment relation, price-fixing
by master barbers does not directly promote wages and working condi-
tions and, therefore, could not constitute legitimate labor union activity."s
Cost factors, such as rent and miscellaneous operating expenses, return
on capital investment in shop and equipment, and journeymen barbers'
wages, must be deducted from the fixed price before the master barbers'
wages are determined. As independent entrepreneurs, master barbers
could use the union as a means to dictate business policy to competing
barbers.59 Use of the union form by master barbers is a sham employed
solely to restrain trade and secure monopoly profits.6" Such activity is
no more entitled to the labor immunity under state antitrust laws than
a price-fixing agreement established by a master barbers' association.
55. Commonwealth v. McHugh, 326 Mass. 249, 93 N.E.2d 751 (1950). See also
Norris-La Guardia Act, 47 Stat. 73 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 113 (c) (1952) (defining
"labor dispute").
56. See Columbia River Packers' Ass'n v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143 (1942), which
held that the Pacific Coast Fishermen's Union was not an organization of employees
but an independent fishermen's association. Thus the association's activities were not
brought within the protection of the Norris-La Guardia Act. Accord, Hawaiian Tuna
Packers, Ltd. v. International Longshoremen's Union, 72 F. Supp. 562 (D. Hawaii
1947). In Gottesman, Restraint of Trade-Employees or Enterprisers?, 15 U. Cm.
L. REv. 638 (1948), this result is criticized. Although a number of tests are discussed
whereby employees can be distinguished from enterprisers, the writer concludes that
the industry must determine the character of its members. Under none of the proposed
standards would master barbers qualify, however, as employees entitled to organize a
valid union. See Annot., 166 A.L.R. 161 (1946). The strongest language appears in
People v. Gassman, 295 N.Y. 254, 66 N.E.2d 705 (1946), where the New York Court
of Appeals said that "workingmen" means people who perform certain tasks, rather
than people in certain contractual relationships. However, in that case there was the
semblance of an employment relationship between laundry companies and the unionized
laundry deliverers. It seems that even under this broad definition, master barbers
would not be classified as "workers."
57. The most important reason why the barber is not an employee of the customer
is the absence of any financial responsibility by the customer for general business
expenses. Although the customer exercises limited control over the nature of the haircut,
similar control is frequently exercised over independent contractors.
58. Saveall v. Demers, 322 Mass. 70, 76 N.E.2d 12 (1947). Even if a small number
of journeymen barbers were in the union, their valid interest in wages would be over-
ridden by the preponderate interest of the master barbers.
59. Ibid. Because of this, the court enjoined the union's organizational efforts.
60. See Note, 24 U. C]i. L. REv. 733 (1957).
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Journeymen barbers, whether fixing prices solely by a union com-
prised of both master and journeymen barbers or by a combination with
an employer group, might argue that wages are directly related to the
price of barbering service and that price-fixing is, in effect, legitimate,
union wage-fixing. The common method used to determine journeymen
barbers' wages strengthens this argument. Normally journeymen bar-
bers are paid a percentage of the price charged for the barbering service.
When the price for such service falls, union wage rates also fall. More-
over, the differential between barber prices and barber wages is extremely
small. Since journeymen barbers' wages may be seventy-five or eighty
percent of the trade prices, a small decline in the price could undermine
the union wage scale.6
Such an argument"2 was made by a union which used its power to
enforce a price schedule for the New York City furniture moving in-
dustry in exchange for the employers' grant of a satisfactory wage scale.
A New York court held that the agreement did not directly promote the
workers' wages and other working conditions and was, therefore, not
legitimate labor activity;63 instead, the court held that the agreement re-
strained trade in the furniture moving industry.64 Thus when industry
prices rather than industry wages are fixed by employer-union negotia-
tions and when the prices must be paid by some third party, the union's
activities are not immune.
On the other hand, when collective bargaining relates solely to the
prices for an economic function other than labor performed by the union
or its members for the employer, such bargaining constitutes legitimate
labor union activity since the prices established by negotiation are not
arbitrarily charged a third party and the bargaining is essential to pre-
61. "In practically all industries the cost of labor is a substantial part of the
price of goods. To say that under the guise of increasing wages or regulating working
conditions, a union may be permitted to agree with employers' associations so as to
fix the prices which the latter will charge the public for their wares or services . . ."
violates the state antitrust law. Manhatten Storage & Warehouse Co. v. Movers &
Warehousemen's Ass'n, 262 App. Div. 332, 335, 28 N.Y.S.2d 594, 598 (1st Dep't 1941).
Similar reasoning applies when the union itself fixes prices.
62. The union attempted to prove that wages were being protected since cut-throat
competition impaired the ability of the industry to maintain a fair and decent wage
scale for its employees. Thus, unless the union could guarantee employers a regulated
price, the employers could not guarantee the union an adequate wage scale.
63. 262 App. Div. 332, 28 N.Y.S.2d 594 (1st Dep't 1941), rev'd on other grounds,
289 N.Y. 82, 43 N.E.2d 820 (1942).
64. Other instances in which employer-union price agreements have been declared
unlawful labor activity are Overland Publishing Co. v. H.S. Crocker Co., 193 Cal. 109,
222 Pac. 812 (1924); Cleaners, Dyers & Pressers Local 228 v. G.H.W. Cleaners &
Dyers, Inc., 200 La. 83, 7 So. 2d 623 (1942); De Neri v. Gene Louis, Inc., 174 Misc.
1000 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd, 261 App. Div. 920, 25 N.Y.S.2d 463 (2d Dep't 1941). Contra,
Ops. Att'y Gen. La. 34 (1946) (where act was construed not to cover services).
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serve the wage structure. Thus an agreement between motor carrier
companies and independent truck owner-operators (union members) fix-
ing the rental rate which the carriers must pay owner-operators for the
use of their vehicles was held to be legitimate labor bargaining in Local
24, Teamsters Union v. Oliver.65 The Supreme Court accepted the argu-
ment of the union that unless it negotiated to fix rental charges the car-
riers could concede to the union any wage scale demanded, yet pay the
operators so little for the use of their equipment that a part of the wage
would necessarily be needed to keep equipment in operating condition.
The negotiated price was essentially a part of the negotiated wage; re-
gardless of the wage scale the union secured for owner-operators, the
carrier companies had the power to reduce rental rates so that the driver's
take-home wage could never exceed the amount which the company
arbitrarily allowed.
Even if a union shows some connection between wages and prices,
the standard stated in Commonwealth v. McHugh66 should be considered
a minimal standard against which the legitimacy of union price-fixing
activities is measured. In that case a Massachusetts fishermen's union-
composed of employee, employer, and self-employed fishermen-estab-
lished a selling room in Gloucester where prices were fixed and buyers
selected by the union. The Massachusetts court rejected the union's de-
fense that these activities were exempt under the state antitrust law.6" The
court said that the union conduct was not "ordinary labor union activity"
but created a common law monopoly and constituted an unlawful attempt
to fix prices. The court said that a union may not fix trade prices where
other methods are available to secure and protect the wage scale.68 Thus,
proof that union wages were driectly related to the prices charged and
were increased proportionately as higher prices were fixed was held in-
65. 79 S.Ct. 297 (1959). Even in this situation where the union's interest is
directly involved, the state court which heard the cause refused to permit the fixing
of prices and held that this agreement violated the Ohio antitrust law, Ohio Rev. Code
§ 1331.01 (Anderson 1953). Oliver v. All-State Freight, Inc., 1957 Trade Cas. 73237
(Ohio St. App. 1957), appeal dismissed, 167 Ohio St. 299, 147 N.E.2d 856 (1958). If a
state court would not permit union negotiation to fix a price in this situation, it would
clearly refuse to sanction price-fixing where the price was not one solely between
employers and the union and one which was not so integral a part of the wage rate.
66. 326 Mass. 249, 93 N.E.2d 751 (1950) ; 64 HARv. L. Rv. 510 (1951). See also
Wisconsin v. LaSage, 1950-51 Trade Cas. 63741 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1950) (union price-
fixing of materials held unjustifiable as means to fix wage).
67. MAss. GE-N. LAws ch. 93 §§ 2-3 (1932).
68. "There remains open to the defendants many other ways of improving their
condition by insisting upon a more favorable lay and other terms of employment."
Commonwealth v. McHugh, 326 Mass. 249, 263, 93 N.E.2d 751, 760-61 (1950).
sufficient justification for the union's efforts to fix fish prices."9
From these cases, it appears that unless the union can support its
claim that prices are a part of wages, as the union did in the Oliver case,
or that no other means can be used to protect the union wage scale, union
efforts to fix a barbers' price schedule is unlawful union activity. Ob-
viously, barber prices do not form a part of union wages in a manner
similar to that illustrated by the facts of the Oliver case. In addition, the
barbering trade can use methods other than price-fixing to secure ade-
quate wage standards. A journeymen barbers' union can negotiate with
master barbers to set a wage either at a flat rate per person or at a per-
centage of a fluctuating price. By either method, the journeyman barber
can procure the highest wage which the industry can bear, yet competition
will be preserved. Consequently, union price-fixing should be unlawful
when engaged in by barber unions whether prices are fixed by union and
master barber negotiations or by majority vote in a union containing both
journeymen and master barbers.7"
Although the industry's attempts to regulate prices by union-master
barber agreements have been declared unlawful,"' state courts have not
yet expressly forbidden price-fixing by barber union vote. Oddly enough
master barbers who have been subjected to organizational picketing and
other organizational activities by unions infrequently set up as a defense
the fact that the union seeks organization to compel compliance with the
union price schedule,72 even though such a defense should be effective.
While state courts have indicated that organizational activities for the
69. See also De Neri v. Gene Louis, Inc., 174 Misc. 1000 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd,
261 App. Div. 920, 25 N.Y.S.2d 463 (2d Dep't 1941) ; Falciglia v. Gallagher, 164 Misc.
838, 299 N.Y. Supp. 890 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
70. The union may be able to use local licensing procedures to preserve union
dictated price schedules to accomplish price-fixing without resorting to outright union
price setting. The union might be able to influence a local licensing board to refuse
licenses to barbers who charged less than union recommended prices.
The barbering union has attempted to use the union shop card as a means to
preserve uniform trade prices by threatening to withdraw the card from any shop
where prices or working conditions fall below stipulated levels. This method has not
proved itself satisfactory in all states. See in particular a discussion of this in Note,
24 U. CmI. L. REv. 733 (1957); Annot., 42 A.L.R.2d 709 (1955).
Normally the union card cases have arisen when the union attempted to force em-
ployers into the union. See note 72 infra.
71. De Neri v. Gene Louis, Inc., 174 Misc. 1000 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd, 261 App.
Div. 920, 25 N.Y.S.2d 463 (2d Dep't 1941).
72. Interesting discussions of cases where barber unions have sought to organize
master barbers but with a conspicuous failure to mention price-fixing as a defense are
found in Herzog, Organization of Self-Employed by Unions, 27 CHI.-KET L. REv. 263
(1949), and Note, 41 MiNN. L. REv. 655 (1957). It is perhaps natural that cases
would not arise expressly on the price-fixing issue since master barbers might appreciate
union help in acquiring monopoly profits, even at the cost of higher, union-dictated wages.
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purpose of fixing prices within the barbering industry may be illegal,"'
the courts have generally found some other basis upon which to grant
the master barber-whether an employer or self-employed-relief from
these union organizational drives.7"
State legislation. Obviously where antitrust laws are rigorously
enforced and are construed to include services within their coverage, legis-
lation can be of considerable importance to the barbering industry."3
Even where antitrust laws are interpreted to exclude services, practical
limitations on the effectiveness in certain localities of master barber agree-
ments and union activities may make legislation advantageous."0 This
third method of industry regulation, however, has been received by state
courts with mixed reactions. Many states have enacted statutes 7-- some
of which are still in effect 7s-investing a state board of barber examiners
with power to establish a schedule of prices to which all barbers in a city
or county must adhere."9 The board's action is typically contingent upon
73. Saveall v. Demers, 322 Mass. 70, 76 N.E.2d 12 (1947) ; Flatt v. Barbers Union,
304 S.W.2d 329 (Tenn. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 904 (1957).
74. E.g., Kerkemeyer v. Midkiff, 299 S.W.2d 409 (Mo. 1957) (organizing employ-
ers into same union would destroy collective bargaining); Flatt v. Barbers Union,
304 S.W.2d 329 (Tenn. 1957) (right to work statute) ; Wisconsin Employment Relations
Bd. v. Journeymen Barbers, 256 Wis. 77, 39 N.W.2d 725 (1949) (statute proscribing
financial contribution by employers to union construed to include union dues). On the
other hand, a number of states have permitted barber union organization of employer
and master barbers on the theory that they are competitors. E.g, Riviello v. journeymen
Barbers, 88 Cal. App. 2d 499, 199 P.2d 400 (1948). In such cases, master barbers
apparently have not raised the price-fixing issue.
75. Among those states which have included services within the coverage of anti-
trust statutes, only New Mexico has upheld the constitutionality of such legislation.
See note 32 supra. Indiana and California, both of whom include services, have declared
such legislation unconstitutional.
76. Among those states which have excluded services from the scope of antitrust
statutes, Louisiana and Nebraska now have price-fixing legislation, note 78 infra.
Louisiana and Minnesota have upheld the constitutionality of such legislation, note 92
infra. Arkansas and Iowa have declared such legislation unconstitutional, note 98 infra.
Barber price-fixing statutes have been declared unconstitutional in four states where
the common law governs antitrust suits. Beard v. City of Atlanta, 91 Ga. App. 584,
86 S.E.2d 672 (1955) ; Kent Stores v. Wilentz, 14 F. Supp. 1 (D.N.J. 1936) ; Christian
v. La Forge, 194 Ore. 450, 242 P.2d 797 (1952) ; Haigh v. State Bd. of Hairdressing, 76
R.I. 512, 72 A.2d 674 (1950).
77. Much of this legislation can be explained by the economic conditions of the
1930s. During that period, cut-throat competition apparently became quite acute in the
barber industry.
78. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6551; FLA. STAT. § 476.26 (1955); KAN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 65-1830 (1949) ; LA. Rav. STAT. § 37:420 (1950) ; MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§ 66-409 (1947) ; NEB. RFV. STAT. § 71-225 (Supp. 1957) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 67-14-36
(1953); N.D. REv. CODE § 43-0416 (1943); OILA. STAT. tit. 59, § 102 (Supp. 1955);
R.I. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 5, § 5-27-19 (1956).
79. E.g., LA. Rv. STAT. § 37:420 (1950).
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petition by a group of two-thirds"0 or three-quarters"' of the licensed
barbers within the city or county and must be preceded by investigations
and hearings upon the merits of the prices to be fixed. Either a board
or a small representative barbers' group has the authority to initiate pro-
ceedings to determine the sufficiency of the prices once they are estab-
lished and to alter them as economic conditions fluctuate. 2 Once estab-
lished, these prices have the sanction of law. In this respect, legislative
price-fixing is more advantageous than trade agreement or union regula-
tion. To prevent any deviation from the fixed prices, state statutes
threaten a barber with injunction proceedings initiated by the board" or
with criminal proceedings of a misdemeanor nature.8 ' Uniform enforce-
ment so effective is unavailable to master barber agreement or union
regulation.
Statutes authorizing the fixing of barbers' prices are enacted under
the police power upon the theory that they protect and promote the public
health, safety, and welfare. Non-conforming barbers attack the consti-
tutionality of such statutes and frequently secure their invalidation be-
cause of (a) an unlawful delegation of legislative power or (b) a lack
of state due process of law.
Statutes invalidated for unlawful delegation 5 are drafted initially
to confer law-making power upon the local barbers, themselves, and
authorize local barber groups to initiate legislation while leaving to the
state board only the power to give approval or disapproval to the price
schedule agreed upon by the barbers.8 6 Delegation of this nature confers
80. E.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 102 (Supp. 1955).
81. E.g., N.D. REV. CODE § 43-0416 (1943).
82. MONT. REV. CODE ANx. § 66-409 (1947).
83. E.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6558. "Any person who violates a minimum
price schedule established by the board may be enjoined by a court of conpetent juris-
diction upon the petition of the board." See Donato v. Barber Examiners, 56 Cal. App.
2d 916, 133 P.2d 490 (1943).
84. E.g., LA. REv. STAT. § 37:425 (1950) imposes a penalty of $25 to $300 and im-
prisonment for six months, each day constituting a separate offense. FLA. STAT.
§ 476.31 (1955) gives the commission power to revoke or suspend a barber's certificate
of registration after proper hearings. It is a misdemeanor to practice barbering without
such registration. FLA. STAT. 88 476.01, 476.24 (1955).
85. Robbins v. Webb's Cut Rate Drug Co., 153 Fla. 852, 16 So. 2d 121 (1944);
Hollingsworth v. State Bd. of Barber Examiners, 217 Ind. 373, 28 N.E.2d 64 (1940);
La Forge v. Ellis, 175 Ore. 545, 154 P.2d 844 (1945); Revne v. Trade Comm'n, 113
Utah 155, P.2d 563 (1948); State v. Neveau, 237 Wis. 85, 294 N.W. 796 (1940),
rehearhig denied, 237 Wis. 108, 296 N.W. 622 (1941) ; State ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Fasekas,
223 Wis. 356, 269 N.W. 700 (1936).
86. "A delegation of legislative authority does not occur when it is provided in a
statute that some administrative officer or board shall have the responsibility of
determining whether facts or a state of things exist upon which the law makes or
intends to make its own action depend, since there is a clear distinction between the
delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to
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upon the barbers both the power to decide whether any schedule of prices
shall be adopted and the power to determine the general level of prices
once such a schedule has been established. Such delegation destroys the
state's price-fixing authority-if the court interprets the legislature to
have this authority-and substitutes local group judgment for legislative
judgment. With such unfettered power in local groups, the industry not
only has the power to fix barber prices whenever advantageous to the
trade but also the power to force the consumer onto a one-way price
street.8s
Even though a state court decides that a statute does not delegate
legislative power to barber groups unlawfully, the court may invalidate
the statute on due process grounds. In one state a barber price statute
was invalidated for unlawful delegation"8 and was subsequently modified
and re-enacted by the state legislature only to be invalidated by the state
court on due process grounds.8 " Such judicial action indicates that price-
fixing legislation, itself, is inimical to judicial standards of economic
welfare no matter what the procedural safeguards.
In recent years the United States Supreme Court has held that state
economic regulation does not violate the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment.90 Consequently the burden of challenging the validity
of such legislation has passed to and has been accepted by the state
courts,9 only a few of which interpret state constitutions to permit
what the law shall be, and confering an authority or discretion as to its execution,
to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law." Hollingsworth v. State Bd. of
Barber Examiners, note 85 supra.
87. "If the Legislature can pass to a small percentage of members of any particular
business or profession the right to prevent prices from following the fluctuations of
economic conditions, then it can permit a small percentage of the members of all
business and professions to require the majority of other members and the public
generally to tread a one-way price street. To not realize that without standards to con-
trol, this way would always be up, would be for us to close our eyes to what all others
are able to see." Revne v. Trade Comm'n, 113 Utah 155, 177, 192 P.2d 563, 575 (1948).
88. Hollingsworth v. State Bd. of Barber Examiners, 217 Ind. 373, 28 N.E.2d 64
(1940).
89. State Bd. of Barber Examiners v. Cloud, 220 Ind. 552, 44 N.E.2d 972 (1942).
90. The trend started in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) and culminated
in Lee Optical Co. v. Williamson, 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955), when Mr. justice Douglas
said: "The day is gone when this court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to strike down state laws regulatory of business and industrial conditions,
because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school
of thought. . . . '[F]or protection against abuses by legislature the people must resort
to the polls, not to the courts.' Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876)."
91. As a consequence of this occurance, state courts have developed a considerable
body of state substantive due process of law. Hetherington, State Economic Regulation
and Substantive Due Process of Law (pts. 1-2), 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 13, 226 (1958);
Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the States, 34 MINN. L. REV.
91 (1950) ; Note, 53 COLTJM. L. REv. 829 (1953) ; Note, 18 OHIO ST. L.J. 384 (1957).
NOTES
economic legislation in accord with the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the fourteenth amendment.9 2  The constitutional principle most fre-
quently employed by state courts to invalidate price-fixing legislation on
due process grounds is freedom of contract. 3 Freedom of contract em-
braces the right of the seller to negotiate with the buyer on the prices to
be paid for goods or services furnished by the seller.9 4 Specifically the
right imposes a substantial state constitutional barrier upon legislative
attempts to fix industry prices which deprive the seller of this right.
However, freedom of contract is not absolute but may be curtailed by
reasonable legislation designed to promote the public health, safety, and
welfare."2 The problem which state courts must resolve is whether the
fixing of barber prices is reasonably related to the promotion of the pub-
lic health, safety, and welfare. In the few cases where the constitutional-
ity of barber price-fixing statutes has been upheld, the state courts have
generally based their decision on the findings by the legislature that prices
in the industry are related to the public health. These courts have ac-
cepted the policy statements in the statutes that adequate prices enable
the barber to maintain a sanitary and healthful shop for patrons and that
without a rigidly enforced schedule of prices the sanitation in the indus-
try will deteriorate."' Most state courts, however, inquire beyond the
92. Smith Bros. Cleaners & Dryers v. People ex rel. Rogers, 108 Colo. 449, 119
P.2d 623 (1941) ; McRae v. Robbins, 151 Fla. 109, 9 So. 2d 284 (1942) ; Miami Laundry
Co. v. Florida Dry Cleaning & Laundry Bd., 134 Fla. 1, 183 So. 759 (1938) ; Board of
Barber Examiners v. Parker, 190 La. 214, 182 So. 485 (1938) ; State v. McMasters, 204
Minn. 438, 283 N.W. 767 (1939) ; Arnold v. Board of Barber Examiners, 45 N.M. 57,
190 P.2d 779 (1941) ; State Dry Cleaners' Bd. v. Compton, 201 Okla. 284, 205 P.2d 286
(1949) ; Herrin v. Arnold, 183 Okla. 392, 82 P.2d 977 (1938); Ex parte Tennyson,
184 Okla. 50, 84 P.2d 637 (1938).
93. Many states have constitutional provisions similar to the fourteenth amendment
while others have provisions which have been interpreted to mean the same. Note, 53
CoLuM. L. REv. 831 n. 40 (1953).
94. "The individual's right to engage in a lawful business, to determine the
price of his labor and to fix the hours when his place of business shall be kept open,
except as they conflict with the police power, are personal privileges and liberties within
the protection of the Indiana Bill of Rights." State Bd. of Barber Examiners v. Cloud,
220 Ind. 552, 573, 44 N.E.2d 972, 980 (1942). In City of Mobile v. Rouse, 233 Ala.
622, 173 So. 266 (1937), the constitutional guarantee of "liberty" was construed to
embrace the individual's right to contract for his prices.
95. "It is only when the interests and welfare of the public in general are clearly
threatened by the unrestrained exercise of the individual right, that the individual right
must give way to reasonable limitation and regulation for the public good. The courts
must ever be watchful to protect the personal rights guaranteed by state and federal
constitutions, and to prevent encroachments thereon by legislative fiat, unless actually
essential to the protection of the public welfare." Christian v. La Forge, 194 Ore. 450,
462, 242 P.2d 797, 803 (1952).
96. In Arnold v. Board of Barber Examiners, 45 N.M. 57, 109 P.2d 779 (1941),
the court stated that it would give great weight to the legislative finding of fact and
would not inquire into the wisdom of the legislature's decisions.
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legislative findings of fact and into the actual relation between prices and
public health. These courts require proof of this relation before sustain-
ing the constitutionality of the statutes." Such inquiries have resulted
in the invalidation of price-fixing legislation because of the inadequacy
of proof that stable and fixed prices directly promote sanitary shops.98
On the contrary, variations in ability, location, and operating expenses
are the material factors which determine profit margins. The regulation
of prices, alone, cannot assure an adequate level of shop sanitation. Thus
the regulation or fixing of industry prices by legislative fiat is an arbi-
trary infringement upon freedom of contract which denies the individual
due process of law.
In summary, both antitrust laws and constitutional prohibitions
against unwarranted infringements upon the freedom of contract protect
the principle of competition. Antitrust statutes protect the individual
and the community from harm wrought by private group restraint of
trade and elimination of competition. Freedom of contract-based in
part upon the same theory of free competition-protects the individual
from legislative action which arbitrarily denies him the ability to com-
pete. But neither principle is absolute. Antitrust statutes may not pre-
vent unions from fixing prices if such price-fixing qualifies as legitimate
labor activity. Freedom of contract is also subject to limitation. When
the prices fixed relate reasonably to the promotion of the public health,
the individual's right is subject to limitation for the public good. Unless
public benefit from the breach of antitrust or contract freedom principles
outweights the public benefit from their observance, violation of an anti-
trust law or infringement upon freedom of contract should be unwar-
ranted. Fixed prices in the barber trade do not directly preserve a
validly negotiated wage scale, so attempts to fix the prices in the trade
should not be entitled to the exemption given by antitrust laws to labor
97. E.g., State Bd. of Barber Examiners v. Cloud, 220 Ind. 552, 44 N.E.2d 972
(1942) (explaining that the legislative finding is usually based upon pressure group
activity).
98. Lisenba v. Griffin, 242 Ala. 679, 8 So. 2d 175 (1942) ; City of Mobile v. Rouse,
233 Ala. 622, 173 So. 266 (1937); Edwards v. Board of Barber Examiners, 72 Ariz.
108, 231 P.2d 450 (1951) ; Noble v. Davis, 204 Ark. 156, 161 S.W.2d 189 (1942) ; State
Bd. of Dry Cleaners v. Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners, Inc., 40 Cal. 2d 436, 254 P.2d 29 (1953) ;
Ex parte Kazas, 22 Cal. App. 2d 161, 70 P.2d 962 (1937); State ex rel. Fulton v.
Ives, 123 Fla. 401, 167 So. 394 (1936); State Bd. of Barber Examiners v. Cloud, 220
Ind. 552, 44 N.E.2d 972 (1942); Duncan v. City of Des Moines, 222 Iowa 218, 268
N.W. 547 (1936) ; Christian v. La Forge, 194 Ore. 450, 242 P.2d 797 (1952) ; Haigh
v. State Bd. of Hairdressing, 76 R.I. 512, 72 A.2d 674 (1950); State v. Greeson, 174
Tenn. 178, 124 S.W.2d 253 (1939).
NOTES
activities. Because of lax enforcement of state antitrust statutes99 and
the interpretation of these statutes to exclude services, however, these
price-fixing activities are generally not proscribed. Neither do fixed
prices reasonably relate to shop sanitation. Thus the individual's right
to contract outweighs any remote benefit to the public and an infringe-
ment upon this right violates state constitutional protection. Since the
barbers have not demonstrated that the breach of antitrust and freedom
of contract principles falls within the legally recognized exceptions to these
principles, state courts occasionally do and logically should always re-
fuse to uphold or enforce price-fixing attempts within the barber trade
by master barber agreement, union activity, or legislative enactment.
THE FORMALITIES ESSENTIAL TO A VALID MARRIAGE
IN INDIANA
In 1957 the Indiana General Assembly declared that "all marriages
known as 'common law marriages'" contracted subsequent to January 1,
1958, should be null and void.' By adopting this terminology the legis-
lature has provided that a marriage founded solely on a contract per verba
de praesenti, cohabitation as husband and wife, and community reputa-
tion2 is invalid. The Indiana courts will, therefore, be called upon to de-
cide which of the existing statutory provisions relating to licensing and
ceremony3 are essential to the formation of a valid marriage. In addi-
tion, the courts may be presented with the problem of whether a marriage
may be sustained which was contracted in accordance with the statutory
provisions but to which an impediment unknown to the parties and later
removed existed at the time of solemnization.4 These problems are of
more than academic interest, for, regardless of the frequency with which
99. State antitrust laws are characterized by their lax enforcement. See Note, 32
COLUm. L. REv. 347 (1932); Note, 43 ILL. L. REv. 205 (1948); Note, 1951 Wis. L. REV.
657.
1. IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-111 (Supp. 1957).
2. These were the three requisites of a valid common law marriage announced in
Anderson v. Anderson, 235 Ind. 113, 131 N.E.2d 301 (1956). Cohabitation and com-
munity reputation might be sufficient to allow an inference that there was a contract
in the present tense in the absence of testimony by one of the parties as to what the
agreement was. Where the contract was written and witnessed, reputation might not
be required.
3. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 44-205, -206, -208 to -212, -301, -304 to -306 (1952) ; 44-201,
-202, -207, -213, -303 (Supp. 1957).
4. For graphic illustrations of possible problems of the latter type see Small,
So We Killed the Common Law Marriage or, Did We Kill the Conniwn Law Marriagel,
Res Gestae, Sept. 1957, p. 1.
